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Code Blue! Ambulance Manufacturing
Specifications May Pre-empt State Common

Law Claims*

Imagine for a moment, that you work as a design engineer for an
ambulance manufacturing company. The year is 1970, and your industry is
in chaos. Companies are using old vans, station wagons, hearses and many
other inefficient, dangerous vehicles as ambulances. And why not? No
standards or mandatory design requirements exist specifically for
ambulances. Many companies can outfit an old, used station wagon with
minimal hospital gear, then advertise and sell the vehicle as an ambulance,
and make off with a substantial profit. Of course communities are enraged,
and patient's rights groups are screaming for some uniform requirements,
but the legislators refuse to act. Are the ambulance manufacturer lobbyists
too powerful? Is it not in a legislator's best interest to take up the fight?
Does it really matter why no uniformity exists, or is it just important that
your industry has avoided such uniformity? Product liability law suits
abound, and juries all over the country make decisions that stretch across
the spectrum. Some manufacturers are liable in Illinois, but not liable for
the same vehicle in Wisconsin. Verdicts range from hundreds of dollars to
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Just when you have designed an
ambulance you think is safe, a jury in California or Georgia or South
Carolina finds the exact design to be defective. And while your company
is busy jumping from one foot to the other, Congress does nothing. The
chaos continues.
Fast forward to the year 1995. You are now the CEO of the
ambulance manufacturer and you are enjoying successful profits and a
great safety record. Congress passed Federal Specification KKK-A-1822
in the early 1970s, and since the adoption of the ambulance manufacturing
specification, the industry has finally settled on a uniform design
benchmark. Why? Federal Specifications are purchasing guidelines; if
your vehicle fails to meet the specification, the United States of America
will not purchase your ambulance. As a result, no domestic ambulance
manufacturer builds an ambulance that does not meet the specification, for
the United States is a major customer. KKK-A-1822 is now in its fifth
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edition (KKK-A-1822D), revised to increase safety and coincide with
technological advances in medicine and vehicle manufacture. However,
yesterday a jury in Texas awarded a verdict in a lawsuit for the plaintiff,
who claimed that defective ambulance manufacture caused her injuries.
You look up the blueprints of the ambulance and find that the vehicle was
designed and built according to the federal specifications. Has a state
common law claim just rendered KKK-A-1822D obsolete? The verdict
threatens the uniformity of the industry, and you wonder if the chaos you
experienced at the beginning of your career may haunt you again at the end
of it. But should a state court be able to nullify a federal specification like
that? Is it not true that federal laws supercede conflicting state laws? Can
federal specifications pre-empt state common law claims? Perhaps.
INTRODUCTION

This article seeks to apply the pre-emption test to federal
specifications. The basic question is whether Federal Specification KKKA-1822D can pre-empt state tort claims. Part I of the comment seeks to
introduce the reader to the basics of pre-emption and provide a framework
and foundation from which the reader can build as the analysis progresses.
Part II summarizes a chronological history of important Supreme Court
cases that have changed, further developed, or questioned contemporary
pre-emption analysis.1 In Part III, the reader is introduced to the federal
specification relating to ambulance manufacture, and provided with a
The
legislative history and regulatory analysis of the specification.
specification is hypothetically tested in Part IV with respect to its preemptive reach, and conclusions are subsequently drawn. As the Supreme
Court decides the parameters of federal pre-emption of state laws and
claims, arguments such as that which follows will become more common.

1. See generally Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never
Was: Pre-emptionDoctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 1379 (1998) (describing an
extensive history of pre-emption cases and the author's disdain for current pre-emption
jurisprudence).
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I. PRE-EMPTION

The doctrine of federal pre-emption finds its origins in the
Constitution of the United States of America, specifically, in Article VI,
Section 2, also known as the Supremacy Clause.2 Under the Supremacy
Clause, state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of
Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution" are invalid. The United
States Supreme Court has summarized the doctrine of pre-emption in
recent cases, providing a seemingly basic set of rules for determining when
federal regulation displaces state law or action. The Court has stated that
the "ultimate task in any pre-emption case is to determine whether state
regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of the [federal]
statute as a whole. ' 4 It has further held that the "purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone" in pre-emption analysis.' Arguably, these principles
provide the requisite structure on which courts can rule with respect to preemption. In reality, however, the analysis is more complex.
The Supreme Court has described three ways that federal laws or
regulations can pre-empt state law. The first is through express preemption, where Congress explicitly defines "the extent to which its
enactments pre-empt state law.",6 Since pre-emption is essentially a
question of congressional intent, where Congress has clearly stated its
intentions with respect to pre-emption in the statute, courts have a
relatively "easy" task.7
However, where express pre-emptive intent is missing, "state law is
pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the

2.

The Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
3.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 263 (1824).
4.
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
5.
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks
v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); see also Shaw v. Delta
6.
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983).
7.
English, 496 U.S. at 78-79.
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Federal Government to occupy exclusively." 8 This doctrine of implied
intent finds foundation in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., a Supreme
Court case from 1947. 9 The Court stated that intent could be inferred from
a "scheme of federal regulation.., so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."' The
inference is also appropriate where an act of Congress touches "a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant" that the federal regulatory
scheme tacitly precludes application or "enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.""1 This is known as "field pre-emption."' 2
The third and final approach to pre-emption, termed "conflict preemption,"' 3 is a second form of implied pre-emption. This doctrine
provides that where an actual conflict between state law and federal law
exists, the federal law pre-empts the conflicting state law. 14 Examples of
conflict pre-emption exist where it is impossible to comply with both the
federal and state laws,15 or where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' 6 It is this last form of pre-emption that this article seeks to
analyze. Can the boundaries of pre-emption reach state common law
claims that disrupt the purpose and objectives of federal purchasing
specifications? Before one applies the current pre-emption analysis to this
question, a history of how the Court has come to define the pre-emption
doctrine is necessary.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
(1963).
16.

Id. at 79.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
Id. at 230.
Id.
See English, 496 U.S. at 78-80.
Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 684 N.E.2d 648, 654 (Ohio 1997).
Id. at 654.
See, e.g., Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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II. PRE-EMPTION: FROM SA VAGE TO GEIER
A. SAVAGE V. JONES

The evolution of the Supreme Court's modem-day examination of
pre-emption began in Savage v. Jones.17 There, the Court distinguished for
the first time between express and implied pre-emption, and consequently
proposed general guidelines for pre-emption. In that case, the Court
considered whether the Federal Food and Drug Act overrode a state statute
18
requiring the publication of certain information on animal food labels.
The Court identified implied pre-emption when, after establishing that no
express denial of the state's right to regulate existed, it wrote:
Is, then, a denial to the State of the exercise of its power
for the purposes in question necessarily implied in the
Federal statute? For when the question is whether a
Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the
statute must of course be considered and that which needs
must be implied is of no less force than that which is
expressed. If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be
accomplished ... the state law must yield to the regulation
of Congress .... 19
The Court further cautioned against finding implied pre-emption
where no actual conflict between the laws exists, ordering that "such intent
is not to be implied unless the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual
conflict with the law of the State., 20 This "actual conflict" standard has
survived to remain a part of implied pre-emption analysis today.2'
B. HINES V. DA VIDOWITZ

22

Almost thirty years later the Court decided Hines, which considered
whether a Pennsylvania law that required aliens to carry an identification
card at all times was pre-empted by the Federal Alien Registration Act,

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
See id. at 521-24, 529.
Id. at 533.
Id.
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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which made no such requirement.23 Challengers of the law argued that the
Federal Alien Registration Act comprehensively regulated alien registration
in the United States and therefore pre-empted any state regulation that
attempted to infringe on that comprehensive scheme. 24 The federal statute,
however, did not include a statement declaring its intent to pre-empt state
law, which forced the Court to look to implied pre-emption:
[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its
superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete
scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard
for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with,
curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce
additional or auxiliary regulations.2 5
The Court, deserting the opportunity to define one uniform, universal
constitutional test for pre-emption resolved the issue as follows:
In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear
distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to
determine whether, under the circumstances of [a]
particular case, [the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
26
objectives of Congress.
Under this analysis, the court determined that the state law disrupted
the federal regulatory system and therefore could not stand in the face of
such a regulatory scheme.2 7
28

C. RICE V. SANTA FE ELEVATOR CORP.

Rice, decided shortly after Hines, used the same structure the Court
laid out in Hines, but in contrast to Hines the statute in Rice included

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 59-61.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 67.
Hines, 312 U.S. at 74.
331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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express pre-emptive statutory language. 29 The Court further emphasized
that "the question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was.' 30
Rice also expanded the discussion about implied pre-emption:
[P]urpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme
of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch
a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject .... Or the state policy may
inconsistent with the objective of the
produce a result
31
federal statute
In the last sentence of the above quote, the Court briefly mentions the
possibilities that state laws and claims that frustrate the purpose of federal
Basically, the Court reinforced its
legislation may be pre-empted.
contention that Congress' purpose to displace state law could be "clear and
manifest" even absent explicit language.32 Rice is the case that truly
established the Court's love affair with the congressional purpose
analysis.33
D. FLORIDA LIME AND A VOCADO GROWERS, INC. V. PAUL

In 1963, however, the Warren Court seemingly yanked back the reins
in favor of the states when it decided the FloridaLime and
pre-emption
on
Avocado Growers34 case. California had in effect a statute that prohibited
the sale or transportation in California of avocados that contained "less than
8 per cent oil, by weight.., excluding the skin and seed., 35 In contrast, the
federal regulations did not gauge avocados by oil content, so theoretically,
many Florida avocados would qualify under the federal standard but fail
California's oil content test.36 The issue was whether the California oil

The statutes in Rice concerned warehousing. Both Illinois and the Federal
29.
government had applicable statutes. Id. at 220.
Id.
30.
Id. at 230 (citations omitted).
31.
Id.
32.
See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 1, at 1389-91.
33.
Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
34.
Id. at 134.
35.
Id. The actual intent of California's oil content statute may be slightly less
36.
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content requirement could stand in the face of such federal legislation.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained why the Court held the
state statute to be valid. Most importantly, the Court realized that the
federal statute explicitly stated that the regulations sought to establish
minimum specifications.
"[The federal statute established] minimum
standards of quality and maturity . . . . That language cannot be said,
without more, to reveal a design that federal marketing orders should
displace all state regulations. By its very terms, in fact, the statute purports
only to establish minimum standards. 37 The Court concluded that the best
inference from the legislative scheme was that Congress intended to allow
the states to retain the power to enact the type of regulation here
challenged.38
39
E. JONES V. RATH PACKING CO.

If the Rice Court clarified the frustration of purpose analysis, the
Jones Court crystallized the role of objective frustration in pre-emption
analysis. It was clear that the Court was willing to recognize two distinct
forms of pre-emption: express and implied. The Jones Court considered
the Federal Acts that regulated net-weight labeling of food in contrast to a
California statute that did the same. 40 The California statute required "the
average weight or measure of the packages or containers in a lot of any...
commodity sampled shall not be less, at the time of sale or offer for sale,
than the net weight or measure stated upon the package.' ' The statute
allowed for no variance for moisture loss during the manufacturing and
storage process. 4' The federal statute, however, allows for such deviations

honorable than protection of its citizens under its police powers. California avocados are
mostly of Mexican ancestry and usually contain at least 8% oil content when mature. In
contrast, the several Florida varieties find their ancestry in West Indian avocados and
actually contain less than 8% oil content when mature. In fact, the Florida avocados are past
their prime ripeness when they measure 8% oil content. Perhaps the statute does not
prohibit unsafe avocados, merely those that are grown in Florida. However, evidence also
suggests that because of short shelf-lives and inefficient shipping methods, very few if any
Florida avocados are ever sold in California, so the plaintiff may have slightly more than a
frivolous claim. Id. at 140.
37.
Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 147-48 (emphasis in
original).
38.
Id. at 152.
39. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
40.
Id. at 522.
41.
Id. at 526.
42.
Id.
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in its labeling requirements.4 ' The Court, as it should when at issue are
statutes normally reserved to the state's police powers, began with an
assumption against pre-emption, only to be overcome by a clear and
4
manifest intent by Congress to pre-empt that regulation.
The Court began its ruling with an interesting caveat, "[t]his [preemption] inquiry requires us to consider the relationship between state and
federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are
written. ' 45 This statement evidences the Court's conviction and confidence
in the obstruction of purposes test, for it does not matter whether the preemptive language is explicit. The Court will look beyond any words to the
interpretation and application of the statute for obstruction of purposes. In
Jones, the Court determined that compliance with both the federal and state
regulations was not impossible, but did find that the state statute obstructed
the purposes of the federal legislation, and therefore, could not stand.46
The Court, therefore, created somewhat of a paradox. That is, no actual
conflict between the laws was established, yet the Court found pre-emption
47
through the obstruction of purposes test.
48

F. PACIFICGAS AND ELECTRIC CO. V. STATE ENERGY COMMISSION

In Pacific Gas, the California legislature prohibited certification of
nuclear power plants until the State Energy Commission made a finding
that demonstrated that the federal government had approved technology for
permanent disposal of high-level nuclear waste. 49 The plaintiff, Pacific
Gas, challenged the law on a pre-emption basis, claiming that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) had federal authority to regulate the use of
nuclear energy. 50 The Supreme Court disagreed. The NRC regulates
safety, not economics, therefore a state regulation based on safety may be
pre-empted, but one based on economics (as was the case) could not be
pre-empted. 1

43.
Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 607(b) (1994).
44.
Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.
45.
Id. at 526.
46.
Id. at 540, 543.
47.
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented to the idea of finding pre-emption where
compliance with both federal and state law was possible. For more information regarding
the Jones decision's threat to federalism principles, see Raeker-Jordan, supra note 1, at
1393.
48.
461 U.S. 190 (1983).
49.
Id. at 197.
50.
Id. at 194.
51.
Id. at 222. The dissent argues that any state ban on nuclear power would be
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This case, at first glance, seems to lessen the importance of purpose
analysis, or at least detract from the influence given it through Jones and
Notice in the Court's summary of the pre-emption analysis in
Rice.
Pacific Gas, obstruction of purpose is given little more than mention as a
piece of conflict pre-emption:
It is well established that within constitutional limits
Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in
Absent explicit pre-emptive language,
express terms.
Congress' intent to supercede state law altogether may be
found from a "'scheme of federal regulation ...so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it,'
because 'the Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject."' Even where Congress has not entirely
displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is
pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility," or where state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' 52
However, despite the unimportance of obstruction of purposes hinted
at in Pacific Gas, the opinion in Gade 3 reaffirms that while the Court may
label its analysis something different, the foundation is still congressional
purpose.

appropriate, "even if [the statute's] authors were motivated by fear of a core meltdown or
other nuclear catastrophe." Id. at 229.
Id. at 203-04 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458
52.
U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Fla. Lime
and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941))(emphasis added).
53.
See case cited infra note 54.
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G. GADE V. NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENTASSOCIATION

4

In Gade, it appears that the Court began to struggle with how to apply
the pre-emption principles that had developed in the past eighty years. The
issue was whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and the
regulations passed under the Act pre-empted two similar Illinois statutes
that attempted to regulate occupational safety and health and public
safety.55
A divided Court decided that the Illinois statutes were
inconsistent with the overall federal statutory scheme.56 What begs
analysis, however, is how the plurality seemingly skipped over the express
language authorizing pre-emption in the statute.
The Court instead
immediately began searching for implied pre-emption in order to apply the
frustrated purpose analysis.57 A dissent by Justice Souter delivered a
cautionary theme, warning the plurality that in a pre-emption analysis, the
presumption is supposed to be against pre-emption of state law, not in favor
of it.58 However, as one continues to analyze contemporary pre-emption
jurisprudence, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court has refused to heed
Souter's warning.
H. CIPOLLONE V. LIGGETT GROUP, INC.59

The Cipollone Court seemed to adopt a more intuitive, common sense
approach to pre-emption analysis. The petitioner, Cipollone, brought suit
against three of the big tobacco producers on behalf of his mother who died
of lung cancer allegedly caused by smoking the respondents' cigarettes. 6°
The claim involved common law tort theories such as strict liability,
negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud, and
under contract law, an express warranty claim.6'
The cigarette
manufacturers argued that the claims were pre-empted by two federal acts,
the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and its successor,

54.
505 U.S. 88 (1992).
55.
Id. at91.
56.
Id. at 107-09.
57.
Gade, 505 U.S. at 99.
58.
Id. at 114-22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59.
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
60. Id. at 509. Rose Cipollone initially brought suit against the cigarette
manufacturers, but died before trial. Id. Her husband continued in her stead, but also died,
after the trial. Id. The couple's son then maintained the action. Id.
61.
Id. at 509-10.
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the 1969 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act.62 The Court held some, but
not all, of the state law claims for damages to be pre-empted.63 Where the
Court seemed to change its position on pre-emption is with respect to its
analysis of express pre-emptive language:
In our opinion, the pre-emptive scope of [the statutes] is
governed entirely by the express language in ... each Act.
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption
and has included in the enacted legislation a provision
explicitly addressing that issue, and when the provision
provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent with
respect to state authority," "there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions" of the legislation ....
Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of
a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted. 64
This seems a healthy departure from the confusion created in Rice,
Jones, and Pacific Gas. However, the Court still used implied pre-emption
to reach its conclusion. Justice Thomas acknowledged in the Freightliner
opinion that, in Cipollone, the Court "engaged in a conflict pre-emption
analysis. 6 5 In so doing, the Supreme Court, despite the rule the Court
itself laid out, went beyond the express provision in the statute to scrutinize
congressional purpose and hunt down pre-emption. This confusion is
echoed by Justices Blackmun and Scalia in the dissenting opinion, where
Justice Scalia commented, "I can only speculate as to the difficulty
lower
66
courts will encounter in attempting to implement [today's] decision.,

62.
Id. at 510.
63.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31.
64.
Id. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) and
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987) (opinion of Marshall, J.)).
65.
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289 (1995).
66.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 555 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. 543-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)).
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I. FREIGHTLINER CORPORATION V. MYRICK

7

This case looked at the pre-emptive effect of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and again tried to clarify the rules of
pre-emption. The plaintiffs brought suit in state court for injuries allegedly
caused by the negligent design of defendant's products.68 The defendants
claimed that a federal standard pre-empted the common law, even though a
federal court had suspended the standard. 69 The defendants argued that the
suspension is regulation itself, or that, because the appropriate federal
agency refused to regulate, such absence implicitly meant that regulation
was inappropriate, and any state regulation should be invalid. 70 The Court
held that the absence of regulation does not displace a state common law
action.7 1 Important to the development of pre-emption, however, was the
Court's explanation of the mutual exclusivity of implied and express preemption, or lack thereof:
The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach
of a statute "implies" - i.e. supports a reasonable inference
- that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters
does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses
any possibility of implied pre-emption . . . . At best,
Cipollone supports an inference that an express preemption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not
establish a rule.72
The Court's clarification of Cipollone seemed not to clarify, but
instead detracted from or weakened Cipollone. In Cipollone, great power
was given to any express. pre-emption clause, but the Court in Freightliner
checked that power." Implied pre-emption thus found new life in preemption jurisprudence.

67.
514 U.S. 280 (1995).
68.
FreightlinerCorp., 514 U.S. at 282.
Id.
69.
70.
Id. at 286. The defendant's claim was based on precedence, however. See Ray
v. At. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 745-75 (1978).
71.
FreightlinerCorp., 514 U.S. at 282.
72.
Id. at 288-89.
73.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-66.
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J. MEDTRONIC, INC. V. LOHR74

Medtronic considered the pre-emptive potential of the Medical Device
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, which did
contain an express pre-emption clause. 5 In defiance of Freightliner,the
Court began its analysis this way:
As in Cipollone .. . we are presented with the task of
interpreting a statutory provision that expressly pre-empts
state law. While the pre-emptive language of [the statute]
means that we need not go beyond that language to
determine whether Congress intended the [statute] to preempt at least some state law . . . we must nonetheless
"identify the domain expressly pre-empted" by that
language.76
The Court seemed finally to rule that implied pre-emption could be
found even if a court did not find certain claims expressly pre-empted:
"[w]e see no need to determine whether the statute explicitly pre-empts
such a claim. Even then, the issue may not need to be resolved if the claim
would also be pre-empted under conflict pre-emption analysis. 7 One
scholar argues that this gives courts the freedom to exhaust all avenues and
search endlessly to find pre-emption.78
79
K. GEIER V. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC.

Geier, decided recently, 80 provides a definite groundwork upon which
to build a pre-emption argument. That case considered the pre-emptive
reach of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and its
pre-emption clause with respect to common law "no-airbag" actions.81 The
Court held that the savings clause in the statute removed tort actions from
express pre-emption but continued to use conflict pre-emption principles to

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

518 U.S. 470 (1996).
Id. at 474-75.
Id. at 484 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)).
Id. at 503.
See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 1, at 1422.
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
May 2000.
Geier, 529 U.S. at 864-66.
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invalidate the lawsuit.82 Justice Breyer, writing for the plurality, made a
bold statement: "We now conclude that the saving clause (like the express
pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles. 8 3 It appears that the Court is content with recognizing
both express and implied pre-emption to exist mutually, thereby leaving
open many possibilities for a federal regulatory scheme to displace state
law or tort actions.
In summary, the current test for finding implied pre-emption can be
stated as follows:
State law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises ... where
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution 84of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."

11.

FEDERAL SPECIFICATIONS

It is not necessary for the purposes of this comment to discuss express
pre-emption, as most federal specification documents contain no such
written intent.85 Implied pre-emption, however, presents an opportunity to
study the validity of the pre-emptive effect of federal specifications on state
laws or claims. Federal specifications are those guidelines employed by
government agencies to mandate the quality, construction, reliability and
86
safety of equipment purchased by those agencies for government usage.
Generally, these specifications exist to define commercial goods and those
'products that have a high potential for common federal agency use., 87
The General Services Administration (GSA) writes, manages, indexes,

82.
Id. at 869.
83.
Id. (emphasis in original).
84.
Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67(1941)).
85.
Federal specifications generally do not contain express pre-emption clauses.
This is true for most federal specifications but may not be all-encompassing. The author
makes no claims that all federal specifications lack express pre-emption clauses.
41 C.F.R. § 101-29.221 (2000).
86.
87.
Id.
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maintains, and approves the specifications, which are eventually published
88
in the Index of Federal Specifications.
As of 1997, well over six thousand of these specifications existed,
ranging from ambulance manufacture specifications 89 to those governing
potholders. 90 Because pre-emption analysis turns on congressional intent,
each product's specification must be evaluated individually 91 to determine
their potential pre-emptive effect over state laws or claims.92 In the end,
some specifications would surely not conflict with state laws,93 and some
may pre-empt state laws or claims. 94 To be sure, numerous federal
specifications may lie somewhere between the absolutes, and it is that type
of specification that warrants careful analysis. This comment will focus on
one federal specification, that governing ambulance manufacture, in order
to sufficiently analyze and verify its pre-emptive effect on certain state
laws or claims.
A.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND PURPOSE

The Court's current test for pre-emption concerns the legislature's
intent in passing the regulation, to determine if Congress actually intended
to displace and pre-empt state laws and claims. 95 Simply stating the
definition of a federal specification 96 probably leaves most legal scholars

88.
FED. SUPPLY SERV., U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., INDEX
SPECIFICATIONS, STANDARDS AND COMMERCIAL ITEM DESCRIPTIONS, (1997).

OF FEDERAL

89.
Fed. Spec. KKK-A-1822D (G.S.A. 1994).
90.
Fed. Spec. A-A-867B (G.S.A. 1997).
91.
."[T]here can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula' for
determining whether a state statute is pre-empted..." Hartley Marine Corp. v. Mierke, 474
S.E.2d 599, 604 (W. Va. Ct. of App. 1996) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
92.
It is impractical to analyze federal specifications generally to determine
whether, as a class, they can pre-empt state law, since the intent in writing and authorizing
specifications may be different with each product. However, a similar framework as that
which follows may be appropriate as a loose guide to analyzing different specifications for
pre-emptive potential.
93.
Specifications that do not disrupt the purpose and objective of Congressional
actions would not pre-empt state laws or claims. See Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at
203-04.
94.
Federal Specifications that disrupt the accomplishment of the goals and
purposes of Congressional action may pre-empt state laws or claims. See discussion infra
Part IV.
95.
See supra text accompanying note 8.
96.
Federal Specifications are those guidelines employed by government agencies
to mandate the quality, construction, reliability and safety of equipment purchased by those
agencies for government usage. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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wondering why pre-emption is even considered in the same breath as these
purchasing specifications, as it seems a far cry from any standard for preemption supported by the Supreme Court. In light of current pre-emption
jurisprudence, however, a blanket assumption that purchasing
specifications can never pre-empt state laws or claims, without first
analyzing the history and foundation of a particular specification's
existence, may be a significant oversight.
Federal Specification KKK-A-1822D 97 finds its genesis during a time
of controversy, disorganization, and confusion in the ambulance
manufacturing industry and provides a prime example of a situation in
which a federal specification may implicitly pre-empt state laws and
The intent behind KKK-A-1822D can be gleaned from
claims.
researching the context that existed in the industry immediately prior to its
inception.
In 1966 and 1967, reports by the Division of Medical Sciences of the
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council (NAS-NRC)
included statements concluding there were no acceptable standards for
ambulance design.98 These reports went so far as to say that the majority of

ambulances in America were unsuitable, carried inadequate supplies, had
incomplete equipment, and were manned by untrained crews. 99 The reports
concluded by calling for something to be done to address the state of
inadequacy in ambulance design and manufacture.1' ° Evidence suggests
that numerous professional organizations offered standardized procedures
for ambulance manufacturers with respect to crew training, requisite onboard equipment, and the management of life-threatening emergencies. 0 1
Unfortunately, nearly all ambulance manufacturers ignored these
recommendations and most refused to voluntarily adopt the procedures. At
the same time, communities were demanding increased and improved
ambulance services. 102 Unsuitable station wagons and mortician vehicles

97. Throughout this comment, the federal specification may be referred to as KKKA-1822 or KKK-A-1822D. Do not be confused, as KKK-A-1822 is the original version of
the specification, and KKK-A-1 822D is the current, revised version of the specification.
98.
COMMITTEE ON TRAUMA AND SHOCK, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCESNATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEGLECTED DISEASE OF MODERN SOCIETY (1966);
COMMITTEE ON TRAUMA, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AMBULANCE SERVICES (1967).

99.

100.

Id.

COMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY

SCIENCES-NATIONAL

RESEARCH

DESIGN AND EQUIPMENT 5 (1970).

101.

102.

Id.

Id.

COUNCIL,

MEDICAL SERVICES,
MEDICAL

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

REQUIREMENTS

FOR

AMBULANCE
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sold off from funeral homes were being used to replace ambulances. The
ambulance manufacturing field was in chaos and in dire need of some
authoritative standardization.
Researchers, ambulance designers, and
emergency medical professionals
soon became aware that federal
13
intervention was necessary. 0
This environment led to the development of KKK-A- 1822 in the early
1970s, the first version of the ambulance manufacturing specification from
which the current specification evolved. The current specification includes,
on the title page, this statement:
The specification has been coordinated with the
Ambulance Manufacturers Division (AMD) of the
National Truck Equipment Association, the American
Ambulance Association (AAA), and the Federal
Interagency on Emergency Medical Services (FICEMS).
The content is based on performance, function, and design
requirements necessary to provide for a safe, reliable,
highly functional ambulance while allowing flexibility for
purchasers to customize the ambulance for individual
needs.1°

103.
104.

Id. at 5.
Fed. Spec. KKK-A-1822D, p.i (G.S.A. 1994).
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The statement reveals the extent to which the federal government went
to standardize the ambulance construction and design industry. Agencies
from the organization responsible for overseeing and representing
ambulance manufacturers (AMD), 10 5 to the National Academy of
Sciences, 10 6 to the Federal Interagency on Emergency Medical Services' °7
collaborated to ensure that ambulance construction across the country met

some acceptable safety and efficiency standards. The GSA intended to

accomplish this standardization by awarding the "Blue Star of Life" (the
familiar blue insignia on ambulances) only to those vehicles that met the
specification.'0 8 Furthermore, as a procurement guide, the specification
limited those ambulances purchased by any federal agency to only those
that met or exceeded KKK-A-1822.' 09

(AMD) Ambulance Manufacturers Division of the National Truck Equipment
105.
Association (NTEA). The NTEA has grown to become the exclusive representative of the
commercial truck body and equipment industry. Approximately 1,600 distributorships,
manufacturing firms, suppliers and various industry-associated companies now belong. The
mission of the NTEA is to further the prosperity of its members by providing programs and
services that facilitate a thriving commercial truck and transportation equipment
marketplace. The Association functions as the hub for all segments of the industry, offering
new knowledge and business opportunities that benefit its members as well as their
See The National Truck Equipment Association, at
suppliers and customers.
http://www.ntea.com/aboutntea.asp (last visited Dec. 6, 2001).
See sources cited supra notes 98, 100.
106.
The USFA chairs and administers the Federal Interagency Committee on
107.
Emergency Medical Services (FICEMS), which serves as a forum to establish and facilitate
effective communication and coordination between and among Federal departments and
agencies involved in activities related to EMS. See Federal Interagency Committee on
Emergency Medical Services, at http://www.usfa.fema.gov/ems/ficems.htm. (last visited
Dec. 6, 2001).
The "Star of Life" can only be displayed if the ambulance conforms to the
108.
federal specification. "The Star of Life is a six-barred cross upon which is superimposed the
staff of Aesculapius (es" cu-la' pi-us) who, in both Greek and Roman mythology, was the
god of medicine and healing." Fed. Spec. KKK-A-1822D, Figure 4, p. 86 (G.S.A. 1994).
The specification is extremely specific on the size, placement, and usage of the Star of Life,
requiring measurements exact to the millimeter on each graphic. Id.
109.
See discussion supra Part III.
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The GSA accomplished its standardization goal: to ensure reliable,
safe ambulance service to communities by specifying standards for
construction.
In fact, twenty-three out of twenty-three ambulance
manufacturers surveyed by the Journal of Emergency Medical Services
currently build their ambulances in accordance with federal specification
KKK-A-1822D." °
The GSA wrote these ambulance specifications to provide a standard
for manufacturers to meet. When these specifications are met, the Federal
Government considers the ambulance safe, reliable, and competently
equipped and staffed. However, a certain fundamental inconsistency arises
when the intent behind federal specifications in general and the specific
intent behind KKK-A-1822D differs. As stated, the intent behind most
federal specifications concerns mandating the quality, construction,
reliability and safety of equipment purchased by government agencies for
the agencies' use."' Federal Specification KKK-A-1822D accomplishes
that, but has at its heart a different intent: to provide the industry with an
authoritative, safe standard. This distinction becomes important because
conflict pre-emption depends upon state action that frustrates the purpose
or objective of federal policy.12
B. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY

Thus far, I have analyzed the intent of the specification and the
objective sought to be achieved, but have yet to determine through what
authority the GSA derives its power to issue and enforce such
specifications. Under the Supremacy Clause,"'3 state laws that "interfere
with, or are made contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of
the constitution" are invalid. 14
Under that principle, one must first establish that federal
Specifications are "laws of the United States," ' 1 5 or that the specifications

110.
The Journal of Emergency Medical Services was first published in 1980, and
JEMS currently hosts the largest national conference for EMS professionals. The Journal of
Emergency Medical Services is an independent voice for improvement of patient care in
pre-hospital settings and publishes an annual directory of national ambulance
manufacturers.
See The Journal of Emergency Medical Services, at
http://www.jems.com/jms/august2000/ambdir.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2001).
111.
See supra text accompanying note 85.
112.
See Savage v.Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 529 (1912).
113.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
114.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 263 (1824).
115.
Id.
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exist through some congressional authority. 1 6 Congress authorized the
Administrator of the GSA to pass regulations to carry out the act that
established the GSA. 17 Furthermore, Congress specifically vested in the
GSA the power to prescribe specifications for the procurement of
government property for all government agencies and organizations
contracting with the federal government.11 8 More specifically, the GSA
enacted a regulatory provision that mandated that all ambulances procured
by the GSA for any government agency must conform to Federal
Specification KKK-A-1822.' 9 Following that chain of analysis, it
becomes clear that the GSA, through its congressionally mandated power,
formally established the industry standard and instituted procurement
requirements for ambulances when it promulgated Federal Specification
KKK-A-1822.
C. STATE TORT CLAIMS

Before one can proceed to the pre-emption analysis, one must first
establish whether a tort claim or common law action is within the reach of
pre-emption.1 20 A few hurdles exist that must be cleared before the
analysis can continue, since even federal safety standards generally are not
1 21
designed to eliminate common law liability for defective products.
However, even if a federal statute does not expressly prohibit state
common law tort actions, such a prohibition may be implied from the
purpose of a federal act, in which case the22state law must yield to the extent
it is incompatible with the federal scheme.
In Geier, the Court decided that the plaintiffs product liability claim,
if successful, would have the effect of imposing a new, higher duty and
standard of care on automobile manufacturers than the federal act required
and would have presented an obstacle to the purpose of that particular
federal legislation. 23 The Court then determined that the claim was

116.
La. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (holding that "preemption may result not only from action taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation");
see also, Carpenter v. Consol. Rail Corp., 631 N.E.2d 607 (Ohio 1990).
117.
40 U.S.C. § 751 (2000).
40 U.S.C. § 471 (2000).
118.
41 C.F.R. 101.26.501(2) (2000).
119.
120.
See e.g., Pokomy v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1990).
Shipp v. Gen. Motors Corp., 740 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 1985).
121.
122.
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1190-91 (E.D.
Tenn. 1985).
123.
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co. 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000).
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invalid. 12 4 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has agreed with the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that "the duties imposed through state
common law damage actions have the effect of requirements that are
capable of creating an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." 25 In addition, pre-emption can
be addressed when the effects of product liability claims would have the
effect of frustrating the federal regulatory scheme.1 26 Other courts have
also recognized that in appropriate cases, state tort claims can be within the
pre-emptive reach of federal statutes. 27 It appears likely that a court will
consider state common law claims that frustrate federal objectives to be
28
within the reach of pre-emption by the appropriate federal regulation. 1
IV. APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS

Having established that federal specifications are acts of Congress and
that the objective of Federal Specification KKK-A-1822 was to provide
essential criteria for ambulance design and manufacture in order to provide
a practical degree of national standardization, one must determine whether
this specification can ever pre-empt state laws or tort claims. Because this
theory has yet to be tested, 29 it is necessary to develop a hypothetical
situation for which to apply this theory and test its veracity.

124.
Id.
125.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd in part
and rev'd in parton other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
126.
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
127.
See, e.g., Minton v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 684 N.E.2d 648, 654-55 (Ohio 1997).
128.
See generally Raeker-Jordan, supra note 1, at 1423.
129.
The author found no case law that would suggest the pre-emptive possibilities
of Federal Specification KKK-A-1822D have been tested.
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The specification adopts certain standards, incorporating them by
reference. 30 One such standard is Ambulance Manufacturing Division
(AMD) Standard 004 pertaining to litter retention systems.131 This standard
requires that the retention system withstand a force of at least 1500 pounds
applied laterally, longitudinally, and vertically. 132 Suppose a private
ambulance 133 that meets the federal specification is involved in an accident
during which the litter retention system fails and the patient is seriously
injured. Suppose also that this ambulance was tested immediately before
the accident according to the specification's testing procedures and passed,
meaning that the litter retention system did withstand at least 1500 pounds
of force. Following the accident the patient experiences a great deal of
pain, requiring numerous medical procedures to repair the damage suffered
in the accident.
After the victim consults his attorney, he files suit against the
ambulance manufacturer, alleging strict liability for his injuries and that the
manufacturer defectively designed the ambulance. Further, suppose the
complaint alleges that the manufacturer should have designed the litter
retention system to withstand 1800 pounds of force. The manufacturer
consults his attorney, and after some research decides to assert pre-emption
as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, theorizing that because he met the
federal specification any judgment that would have the effect of holding the
manufacturer to a higher standard of liability is pre-empted by the federal
specification. Can the defendant's pre-emption defense succeed?

130.
The specification incorporates by reference portions of other federal
specifications, federal standards, military standards, federal legislation and regulations, the
California Motor Vehicle Code, the Tire and Rim Association, Inc., Yearbook, the Society
of Automotive Engineers (SAE), Inc., Standards and Recommended Practices, AMD
Standards, Illumination Engineering Society guides, and policies of the Automotive
Manufacturers. KKK-A-1822D § 2.1-2 (G.S.A. 1994). However, according to section 2.3
of the specification, "In the event of a conflict between the text of this specification and the
KKK-Areferences cited herein, the text of this specification shall take precedence."
1822D § 2.3 (G.S.A. 1994).
131.
A litter retention system provides the means for securing a litter to the floor
and/or side of an ambulance. A litter is the wheeled cot (gurney) on which patients are
strapped during transport. AMD STANDARD 004 § 3.1-3.2 NATIONAL TRUCK EQUIPMENT
ASSOCIATION (July 1991).
132.
AMD STANDARD 004 §4.1 NATIONAL TRUCK EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATION

(July

1991).
133.
We will assume the ambulance was not purchased by the United States
government or any state government that has similar procurement requirements. Courts are
split on whether this "government contractor defense" should apply to both military and
civilian contractors and to what extent it should apply. See generally Carley v. Wheeled
Coach, 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993) and Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
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Any argument based on express pre-emption will certainly fail, as no
pre-emption clause exists in the specification. Unfortunately, express preemption is more easily established than its implied equivalent, because
congressional intent is manifested in a clause within the statute.
Furthermore, pre-emption is not favored in the absence of persuasive
reasons, such as when the facts support no other conclusion 3 or when
Congress has unmistakably so intended.135 Nonetheless, when a party
asserts the affirmative defense of pre-emption, the court should make the
following analysis: whether Congress, in enacting the federal statute or
policy, intended to exercise its constitutionally delegated authority to set
aside the laws of a state. 136 If so, the Supremacy Clause requires the court
to follow federal, not state law. 137 If, however, explicit pre-emption does
not appear in the federal statute, as it does not here, then a court that is
determining whether the federal law pre-empts the state law must consider
whether the federal 38statute's objective or purpose reveals clear, but implicit
pre-emptive intent.
KKK-A-1822 was promulgated to provide stability, standardization,
uniformity and safety to the ambulance manufacturing industry. 3 9 It has
been successful, even undergoing four revisions in the last twenty-five
years in order to keep current with manufacturing technology. 140 To allow
a claim based on negligent design against a manufacturer who met the
specification would serve only to create a new standard in one state and
would surely thrust the industry back into the chaos it experienced prior to
federal intervention.' 4' Simply put, the objective of the specification was to
provide uniformity and standardization to the field. To permit a state tort
claim would upset that uniformity and, therefore, frustrate the objective and
purpose of the federal act. 42 That frustration, under the doctrine of implied
conflict pre-emption, requires a court to fird that the federal regulation
must supercede, displace, and pre-empt the state claim. 43 In other words,
134.
This is termed implied pre-emption.
135.
Hartley Marine Corp. v. Mierke, 474 S.E.2d 599, 603 (W. Va. 1996).
136.
Barnett Bank of Marion County, v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
137.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 263 (1824).
138.
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
139.
See discussion supra Part II1.A.
140.
The current specification is KKK-A-1822D and was preceded by KKK-A-1822,
KKK-A-1822A, KKK-A-1822B, and KKK-A-1822C. The revisions included changes to
the specification to reflect advances in vehicle manufacture, medical equipment, and
emergency life-saving procedures. Past versions available from GSA at 7CAFL, P.O. Box
6477, Fort Worth, TX 76115 (mailing code AMBU-0001).
141.
See discussion supra Part lII.A.
142.
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
143.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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if the compliant manufacturer is held liable, no practical standardization
will have occurred and ambulances that meet KKK-A-1822D will no
longer be considered reliable and safe. The result would be to establish a
body of law that lies in direct contradiction to the purposes of the federal
specification. Under these circumstances, federal pre-emption of the state
claim should be fully justified.
In opposition, however, if Congress really had a "clear and manifest"
intent' 44 to pre-empt state law with respect to this specification, would the
analysis require so many "if, then" leaps? Instead, would not the analysis
be clear, short and definitive? The answer, simply, is no. Most of the
analytical work necessary in this case was needed to establish that the (1)
purpose of (2) a federal act or law was (3) in danger of frustration (4) by a
state law. Initially, the purpose of the federal act had to be lifted from
whatever historical materials were available. 145 Next, the specification had
to be shown to qualify as a federal regulation. 146 Then, one had to establish
that the purpose of the federal specification was in danger of being
frustrated, 147 and lastly, that the frustration (common law tort claim)
qualified as state law. 14 After those four factors were established, the
analysis is quite simple and rather short. Much the same analysis must take
place in every conflict pre-emption test.
However, if a state court is foreclosed, through pre-emption, from
finding that the ambulance was defectively designed, what remedy can an
injured party seek? How can the victim challenge the competence of the
The answer lies within the framework of the
federal specification?
separation of powers doctrine. The objective of the Constitution was to
establish three, separate and equal branches of government, the legislative,
the judicial, and the executive. Each branch has specific duties.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See
See
See
See
See

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
discussion supra Part III.A.
discussion supra Part IlI.B.
discussion supra Part 11I.C.
discussion supra Part III.C.
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The executive branch 149 approves and executes the legislation written
and passed by the legislature,15 ° and the judicial branch151 interprets and
enforces that legislation. 52 At its very foundation, the separation of powers
doct rine forbids one branch of government from exercising powers
properly belonging to a different branch.1 53 Therefore, it is generally
recognized that constitutional boundaries are invaded when one branch of
the government attempts to exercise powers exclusively delegated to
another. 54 Quite simply, the courts are not free to simply rewrite statutes
that Congress has seen fit to pass. The judiciary may not usurp the power
of the legislature.' 55
By allowing a court to increase the standard established by the very
existence of Federal Specification KKK-A- 1822D, the judiciary is in effect
re-writing the specification, a task properly lying within the province of the
legislature. Congress has delegated the authority to the General Services
56
Administration to write, promulgate, and publish federal specifications.
The subject matter is uniquely technical in nature, and the specification
itself has evolved over the course of thirty years, constantly being checked,
rechecked, and rewritten by the very experts that developed it in the first
place. The General Services Administration, not any part of the judiciary,
is the segment of our government with the knowledge, expertise, and
understanding to properly shape the future of the specification. 5 7 How
then, does a victim challenge the specification?
In short, the victim should write her Congressional representative. As
a representative of her constituents, it is the elected official in the
legislative branch whose job it is to spur change in legislation. Congress

149.

U.S. CONST. art. Hl.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. 111.
The court noted that:
"[t]he powers of the government, divided into the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches, are separate and divisible. The
legislative branch has the authority to make, alter, and repeal the
law; the executive branch administers and enforces the law; and the
judicial branch has the authority to interpret and apply the law."
Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995).
153.
Admin. Office of Ill. Courts v. State and Mun. Teamsters, Local 726, 657
N.E.2d 972, 981 (11. 1995).
154.
In re D.L., 669 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Vt. 1995).
155.
Id.
156.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
157.
See generally Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
(using this analysis to explain why the Department of Transportation, not the courts, had the
authority to change their own safety standards).
150.
151.
152.
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gave the authority to the GSA to write the specification, therefore it must
also be Congress that forces or allows the GSA to change the
To allow otherwise is to defile one of the most
specification. 158
fundamental constitutional doctrines, that which both grants power and
limits power simultaneously.
CONCLUSION

Some scholars criticize the Court for its pre-emption rules, terming the
Court's analysis as a threat to federalism and those powers granted to the
states. 5 9 Should a court be allowed to search in every dark comer and lift
every rock to find pre-emption? The answer must be in the affirmative if
federal legislation is to retain its influence and regulatory power. Even
those that claim that the Court has over-extended pre-emption past its
natural and constitutional boundaries 160 must admit that the current
obstruction of purposes doctrine properly permits many acts of the federal
government to pre-empt state laws and claims. Until the Supreme Court
sees fit to revise and narrow the scope of pre-emption, arguments such as
that within this comment will continue to surface and succeed.
-MICHAEL J. DENNINGt

158.
159.
160.
(2001).

t

Id.
See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 1, at 1468-69.
Id.
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